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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Confusion has frequently resulted from attempted applica-
tion of Civil Code provisions in some situations and from absten-
tion, express or implied, in others. Particularly in the area of
donations, the courts have taken the position that the contract
is sui generis, and thus the court is free to search for the best
solution. It is submitted that all contracts of insurance should
be so treated, and that the principles of community property law
should have little or no application outside the preliminary char-
acterizations which do not conflict with settled principles of in-
surance law.
Richard B. Wilkins, Jr.
CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
"The husband is the head and master of the partnership or
community of gains."' This traditional language has been used
in each Louisiana Civil Code to give the husband control and
management of the community.2 However, the extent of the
husband's power over the community has changed greatly since
1808. More and more restrictions on the husband's power to
deal freely with community property have been added to pro-
tect the interests of the wife. This Comment examines the scope
of the husband's authority over the community under present
law and the remedies by which the wife may protect her interest.
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
There were two aspects of the husband's powers in the
system of control and management established by the 1808 Code.
First, he dealt with community property as owner ;8 second, the
wife could not interfere with the husband's management as she
lacked capacity to perform most juridical acts without the hus-
band's authorization. 4 Unauthorized acts of the wife were rela-
tive nullities which the husband could set asideY The articles
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
2. Ibid.; La. Civil Code art. 2373 (1825) ; La. Civil Code p. 336, art. 66
(1808).
3. See La. Civil Code p. 336, art. 66 (1808) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404
(1870).
4. See La. Civil Code p. 28, art. 22 (1808), dealing with the wife's incapacity
to contract, now appearing as LA. CIVIL CODE art. 122 (1870) ; La. Civil Code
p. 28, art. 21 (1808), dealing with the wife's inability to appear in court, now
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 121 (1870).
5. See La. Civil Code p. 28, art. 28 (1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 134 (1870).
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on the wife's incapacities are substantially the same as the cor-
responding articles of the French Civil Code,6 but the immediate
source of the provision enabling the husband to deal with com-
munity property as its owner is uncertain.
The 1808 Code expressly recognized the husband's power to
deal with community property as its owner:
"The husband is the head and master of the partnership
or community of gains; he administers said effects; disposes
of the revenues which they produce, and may sell and even
give away the same without the consent and permission of
his wife, because she has no sort of right in them until her
husband be dead."7
Spanish origin of the provision has been claimed, 8 although
both Pothier 9 and Toullier 10 conclude that the wife has no owner-
ship of community property during the marriage. The final
clause of the provision was not taken from the French Civil
Code." The language that the wife has no right in the com-
munity property until her husband's death seems unusual, as
the 1808 Code provides for termination of the community for
reasons other than the death of one spouse. Both separation
from bed and board 12 and a judicial separation of property13
terminated the community while both spouses were alive. No
commentator was found who supported the requirement that the
husband be dead before the wife's right attaches, although
French and Spanish writers did teach that the wife had no
ownership of community property during the existence of the
community. 4 The language used in the 1808 Code may have
been selected to emphasize the husband's power as head and
master of the community. Whatever its origin, the language
6. See the French texts and English translation of the pertinent articles in 3
LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
PART I 67-75 (1942).
7. La. Civil Code p. 366, art. 66 (1808).
8. See Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847) (citing Febrero). See also
Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188 (1832).
9. See POTHIER, TRAITt DE LA COMM UNAUTb n' 3 (Bugnet ed. 1861).
10. 7 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 76-77 (1833).
11. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1421 merely provides that the husband is sole
administrator of the community and may alienate or hypothecate it without the
wife's concurrence.
12. La. Civil Code p. 32, arts. 10-17 (1808).
13. Id. p. 340, arts. 86-97. Presumably, if a putative marriage were annulled
this too would terminate the community during the life of both spouses. Cf.
LA. CIVIL. CODE p. 28, art. 30 (1808).
14. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 159 (1964).
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was dropped in the 1825 Code and has present significance only
insofar as it illuminates the final paragraph of the article which
was carried forward into the 1870 Code:
"But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the
common property, or otherwise disposed of the same by
fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her action against
the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half
of the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud.' 5
Read together, the provisions of the 1808 Code are consistent,
for if the wife has no interest in the community property until
the death of her husband, her only recourse is against his heirs.
The pattern is less consistent in the present Code, which retains
the old limitation that the wife's remedy for fraud is an action
against the husband's heirs but omits the statutory premise that
the wife is not owner of the community property during the hus-
band's life.16
The trend toward limiting the husband's power over the
community commenced with the 1825 Code. 17 The limitations
it contains were borrowed from the French Civil Code'8 and
were carried forward in article 2404 of the 1870 Code.' 9 Later
legislation has added further restrictions on the husband's
power.
POWER OF THE HUSBAND
Under the present law, the husband has extensive power to
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
16. The jurisprudence has achieved a new consistency. Modern law recognizes
the wife as owner of half the community during its existence. Phillips v. Phillips,
160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926). Likewise, modern law recognizes the wife's
right of action against the husband as well as his heirs. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231
La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956).
17. La. Civil Code art. 2373 (1825).
18. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1422.
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870), as amended: "The husband is the head
and master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects,
disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an
onerous title, without the consent and permission of his wife.
"He can make no conveyance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of the im-
movables of the community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the movables,
unless it be for the establishment of the children of the marriage. A gratuitous
title within the contemplation of this article embraces all titles wherein there is
no direct, material advantage to the donor.
"Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects by a gratuitous and par-
ticular title, to the benefit of all persons.
"But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property,
or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her
action against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half 'of
the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud."
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manage and control the community. Generally, the husband may
alienate community property by onerous title.2 0 He may pur-
chase,21 pledge,2 2 and mortgage 23 community property. He may
place community assets in a corporation. 24 or place them in a
partnership, thus making the community liable for the partner-
ship debts.25 He is the proper person to assert community
claims and to defend claims against the community, 2 or to com-
promise them in his discretion.27 Further, the husband may
make inter vivos donations of community movables by par-
ticular title and he may donate community immovables "for
the establishment of the children of the marriage. '2  Thus, in
the absence of fraud, the husband has power of control suf-
ficient to authorize him to enter into almost any onerous trans-
action he deems proper. However, the power of the husband,
broad as it is, is not unlimited. Since the wife has a vital inter-
est in the community property, some restrictions are necessary
to protect her interest against a husband who proves an un-
faithful administrator of the community.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE HUSBAND'S POWER
Fraudulent Dispositions
The husband's power to enter into onerous transactions is
subject to one important restriction: he can make no disposition
of community property in fraud of his wife's rights. 29 The hus-
band makes a fraudulent disposition if he, in bad faith, so
transfers a community asset that the quantum which the wife
will receive on termination and liquidation of the community
is materially reduced. In the past the courts have been reluctant
to find an onerous disposition fraudulent, perhaps because of
the prevailing concept of the husband's broad power to manage
the community. 30 Intent to injure the wife and actual injury to
20. Ibid.
21. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
22. Wolf v. Wolf, 12 La. Ann. 529 (1857).
23. Belden v. Flanlon, 32 La. Ann. 85 (1880).
24. See Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
25. Carpenter v. Featherstone & Amis, 19 La. Ann. 508 (1867).
26. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 186 (1964).
27. See Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874).
28. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2404 (1870).
29. Ibid. See last paragraph quoted in note 19 supra.
30. Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506, 512 (1884): "Had he [husband]
chosen to squander the community property on unworthy objects or in the gratifi-
cation of extravagant tastes or luxurious indulgences, neither his estate nor his
19651
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her are essential components of a fraudulent disposition.81 - In
considering a challenged disposition the courts examine all fac-
tors surrounding it and no single factor is decisive.3 2 Relevant
factors include the value of the property disposed of in relation
to the value of the total community,3 3 the time of the disposition
in relation to the time of termination of the community, 4 the
domestic climate at the time of the disposition,3 5 whether the
transaction was a simulation,86 and the amount of consideration
received in relation to the value of the asset transferred.87
Property in Name of Wife or Both Spouses
Two amendments to article 2334 impose specific restrictions
on the husband's power. The 1920 amendment provides that
"when title to community property stands in the name of the
wife, it cannot be mortgaged, or sold by the husband" without
the written consent of the wife.38 Prior to the amendment, as
all property acquired during the marriage was presumptively
community property, the husband could alienate property ac-
quired in the wife's name, thus forcing the wife to prove it was
heirs could have been called to an account for it by the community or its represen-
tatives."
3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISN TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1018 (1959) quotes Pothier as saying that
the husband may "abuse his power and let the whole common estate deteriorate
or become a total loss, without any obligation to indemnify his wife. He can let
prescriptive rights of others mature, abandon inherited property, break up per-
sonal effects, kill animals as a display of personal brutality, etc."
31. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956) ; Succession
of Packwood, 12 Rob. 334 (La. 1845).
32. See note 31 8upra; Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118
(1947).
33. In Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947), the court
points out this factor is not decisive, and is important only when considered with
the other particular facts.
34. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956) (disposition
when suit for separation or divorce was imminent) ; Van Asselberg v. Van Assel-
berg, 164 La. 553, 114 So. 155 (1927) (disposition a few days prior to institution
of suit for separation); Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 282, 108 So. 483 (1926)
(simulated donation after suit for separation was filed by husband) ; Belden v.
Hanlon, 32 La. Ann. 85 (1880). But cf. Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54
So. 2d 18 (1951) (seven years prior to suit for separation held to be a time
"unsuspicious") ; Exposito v. Lapeyrouse, 195 So. 814 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940)
(two weeks after wife left husband, two months prior to suit for separation filed
by wife) ; Rundle v. Williams, 184 So. 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) (mortgage
given father in February, divorce suit rendered in March).
35. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956) ; Succession
of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
36. See Van Asselberg v. Van Asselberg, 164 La. 553, 114 So. 155 (1927)
Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 282, 108 So. 483 (1926) ; Belden v. Hanlon, 32 La.
Ann. 85 (1880).
37. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956).,
38. La. Acts 1920, No. 186.
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rher paraphernal property in order to have it returned to her. 9
Presumably the purpose of the amendment was to prevent the
husband from thus involving the wife in litigation over her sep-
arate property.40 The 1962 amendment prevents the husband
from selling, mortgaging, or leasing community immovables
acquired in the name of both husband and wife without the con-
sent of the wife, when she has filed in the conveyance and mort-
gage records an authentic act declaring that her authority and
consent are required for such transactions.4 1 The amendment
changes prior jurisprudence allowing the husband to alienate
community property standing in the name of both spouses.4 2
The wisdom of the amendment seems doubtful. To require the
wife's consent to alienation of property recorded in her name
protects her separate property; the requirement that the wife
join in alienation of community immovables recorded in the
name of both spouses simply serves to restrict the husband's
managerial power and it could lead to serious friction in marital
,relations.
Homestead Exemption
The Louisiana Constitution allows heads of families an ex-
emption from seizure and sale of the homestead owned and
occupied by them to the extent of $4,000.43 This exemption may
be waived, but if the debtor is married the waiver is ineffective
unless signed by the other spouse.44 The provision limits the
husband's power to deal with community property. He may sell
the property45 or make a valid dation en paiement,46 but he may
not defeat the wife's homestead rights by a security transaction
disguised as a sale.47 Thus he cannot execute a mortgage in the
form of a sale and resale,48 or sale with right of redemption, 49
39. See Young v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166 So. 139
,(1936).
40. Ibid.
41. La. Acts 1962, No. 353.
42. See Otwell v. Vaughan, 186 La. 911, 173 So. 527 (1937) (retrocession
by husband) ; Young v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 184 La. 460, 166 So. 139S(1936).
43. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
44. Id. §3.
45. See Pugh v. Hunter, 150 La. 275, 90 So. 646 (1922) ; Nona Milk Co. v.
Swain, 125 La. 233, 51 So. 128 (1910).
46. See Pugh v. Hunter, 150 La. 275, 90 So. 646 (1922).
47. See Underwood v. Flosheim Bros. Dry Goods Co., 129 La. 450, 56 So. 364
(1911) ;Carroll v. Magee, 120 La. 626, 45 So. 528 (1908).
48. See note 47 supra. See also Stewart v. Sutton, 48 La. Ann. 1073, 20 So.
283 (1896).
49. See Becker v. Hampton, 137 La. 323, 68 So. 626 (1915) ; Maxwell v.
Roach, 106 La. 123, 30 So. 251 (1901).
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or by a simulated sale in which the notes of the "vendee" are
negotiated to the creditor and the vendor "repurchases" the
property by assuming the notes and mortgage. 50 The wife's con-
sent to all such transactions is necessary.
Declaration of Homestead
The statutory "declaration of family home"51 restricts the
husband's power to manage the community in a manner similar
to the constitutional homestead exemption. The statute permits
the husband to record an authentic declaration that he is mar-
ried and that he desires to, and does, designate adequately de-
scribed property as a family home. If for six months after the
acquisition of a home, the husband fails to file such declaration,
the wife who is living with her husband 52 may record the dec-
laration.53 Once property is designated as "family home," it
does not lose this status by change of actual residence or by any
other cause except the dissolution of the marriage by death or
divorce, or by an authentic declaration of abandonment or
waiver of status signed by both husband and wife.5 4 Property
designated as "family home" may not be validly sold or mort-
gaged by the husband without the written consent of the wife.55
Restrictions During Pendency of Separation and Divorce Suits
Civil Code article 15058 provides that from the date on which
50. See Jefferson v. Herold, 144 La. 1064, 81 So. 714 (1919).
51. LA. R.S. 9:2801-2804 (1950).
52. The wife is "living with" her husband if she is not separated from bed
and board from her husband or has not abandoned him or the family home. See
Reymond v. Louisiana Trust & Savings Bank, 177 La. 409, 148 So. 663 (1933.)
(husband abandoned wife) ; Mallouf v. Fontenot, 170 La. 612, 128 So. 652
(1930) (same). See also Hodges v. Hodges, 150 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963) (judgment of divorce conclusive against wife that she had abandoned hus-
band so that she was not "living" with him when she filed a declaration of home-
stead).
53. LA. R.S. 9:2802 (1950). The statute provides that the wife's declaration
is limited to property of the community. The declaration has been held effective
when filed by the wife after acceptance of an offer to sell but prior to execution
of the deed, Baumann v. Michel, 190 La. 1, 181 So. 549 (1938), but not effective
against a prior recorded option, Watson v. Bethany, 209 La. 989, 26 So. 2d 12
(1946).
54. See LA. R.S. 9:2804 (1950) ; Smith v. Marino, 28 So. 2d 780 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1947) ; Smith v. Marino, 12 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
55. LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1950).
56. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 150 (1870) : "From the day on which the action of
separation shall be brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract
any debt on account of the community, nor to dispose of the immovables belonging
to the same, and any alienation by him made after that time, shall be null, if it
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an action for separation is brought the husband may neither
contract any debt on account of the community nor alienate com-
munity immovables. As pendency of a suit for separation or
divorce is essential for the operation of article 150, the restric-
tions on the husband's power cease when the suit is abandoned
57
or dismissed. 58 However, the filing of a suit for divorce during
pendency of a suit for separation is not an abandonment of the
latter suit so as to remove the restrictions on the husband's
power. 59
Article 150 distinguishes between debts incurred by the hus-
band and dispositions of commu.ity immovables. The disposi-
tion of the immovables is null if "made with a fraudulent view
of injuring the rights of the wife."'0  Apparently, the courts
require fraud on the part of both the husband and the person
acquiring the property from him to nullify the disposition.6 '
Recently it was held that the sale of community immovables by
the husband during pendency of a separation suit was valid for
a bona fide purchaser when the wife failed to record a notice of
lis pendens.62 On the other hand, fraud is immaterial in the case
of debts-it is simply unlawful for the husband to contract
debts on account of the community.63 Such debts, however, are
not null; they are valid as the separate debt of the husband,6 4
and the wife's failure to record notice of lis pendens in no way
alters the result.
6 5
Restrictions on Donations
Although not expressly stated by the Code, it is settled that
the husband cannot dispose mortis causa of a greater interest
in the community than his half interest.6 6 The courts have rea-
soned that at the moment of death of the husband title to half
be proved that such alienation was made with the fraudulent view of injuring the
rights of the wife."
57. Gastauer v. Gastauer, 143 La. 749, 79 So. 326 (1918).
58. Sciambra v. Sciambra, 153 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
59. See Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
60. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 150 (1870).
61. See Shapiro v. Bryan, 132 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), noted 22
LA. L. REv. 878 (1961) ; Davis v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
62. Shapiro v. Bryan, 132 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
63. LA. CIVI. CODE art. 150 (1870).
64. See Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963);
Ohanna v. Ohanna, 129 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
65. See Landreneau v. Ceasar, 153 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
.66. See Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 177 So. 695 (1937) ; Ramsey. v.
Beck, 151 La. 190, 91 So. 674 (1922).
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the community vests in the surviving wife; and, as a disposition
mortis causa can have effect only at the death of the testator,
there is only half the commnuity to be disposed of by testament.
67
The result seems self evident: the testator cannot dispose of
property which he does not own.
The husband has limited power to make donations inter vivos
of community property. With one exception, the husband cannot
make a valid inter vivos donation of a community immovable.
68
Exceptionally, he may make such a donation for the establish-
ment of the children of the marriage. 69 Apparently, the restric-
tion applies only to purely gratuitous donations and not to:
remunerative and onerous donations.70 Formerly it was held
that the husband could make an onerous donation of a com-
munity immovable by which the charges imposed were in favor
of persons other than the donor, but the decision was legisla-
tively overruled. 7 ' It seems that a valid onerous donation of
community immovables is possible now only if the charges im-
posed inure to the advantage of the donor.
While the husband may make inter vivos donations of mov-
ables by particular title, the Code forbids him to make universal
donations or donations under universal title of community mov-
ables except for the establishment of the children of the mar-
riage.72 The husband's power to donate community movables
by particular title is further restricted by the general principle
that he can make no disposition of community property in fraud
of his wife. In examining donations challenged as fraudulent,
the courts consider relevant the same factors considered in ex-
amining challenged onerous transactions 73 and two additional
factors: whether the husband has concealed the donation from
the wife 74 and whether the wife knew of the donation at the
67. Ibid. This reasonirfg may not accurately reflect the nature of the wife's
interest in property of the community. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 159 (1964).
68. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
69. Ibid.
70. Cf. ibid.; Thompson v. Socit Catholique d'Education Religieuse et
Litteraire, 157 La. 875, 103 So. 247 (1925).
71. Thompson v. Socidt4 Catholique d'Education Religieuse et Litteraire, 157
La. 875, 103 So. 247 (1925), overruled legislatively by La. Acts 1926, No. 96,
amending LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870) to include the sentence: "A gratuitous
title within the contemplation of this article embraces all titles wherein there is
no direct, material advantage to the donor."
72. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
73. See text at notes 33-37 supra.
74. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956) ; Succession of
Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
[Vol. XXV
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time it was made.75 That the husband concealed the donation
seems:to indicate fraudulent intent, but to say that the wife's
mere knowledge of the donation negatives fraud seems unsound.
Of course, the wife may concur in a donation and this would
preclude her from attacking it at a later date, 7 but even if the
wife knew of and disapproved a large donation made by her
husband, she could do nothing about it at that time as she has
no remedy until dissolution of the community. 77
French writers have expressed concern that the husband
might use his powers to alienate community property to favor
his presumptive heirs over the wife and her presumptive heirs. 7
Louisiana courts may not have given sufficient consideration to
this possibility.79 In Succession of Ratcliff80 the court found no
fraud in the husband's donations of $29,640 to his relatives as
compared to donations of $6,930 to the wife's relatives. That
the community assets exceeded $500,000 undoubtedly influenced
the decision. The court also decided that donations made to the
husband's relatives, in absence of an expressed intent that they
be borne by his separate estate, are chargeable to the com-
munity.81 The court reasoned that since the income from the
husband's separate estate inured to the community, he would
be unlikely to reduce the capital of his separate estate. It seems.
that the presumption should be otherwise, for generally dona-
tions to the husband's relations, in no way benefit the wife but
rather enrich such relatives at her expense. Further, imputing
such donations made without the wife's concurrence to the hus-
band's separate estate does not require a diminution of the
husband's capital during marriage but rather an adjustment in
the amounts distributed on partition of the community.
The power of the husband to make inter vivos donations of
movables by particular title has been criticized. 2 The criticisms
seem just. The rule prohibiting donations of immovables by
the husband may have provided sufficient protection to the
75. See Oliphint v. Oliphint, 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951).
76. See Bouny v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 155 La. 437, 99 So. 395
(1924) ; Snowden v. Cruse, 152 La. 144, 92 So. 764 (1922).
77. Bister v. Menge, 21 La. Ann. 216 (1869). See text accompanying note
88 infra.
78. See POTHIER, TRAITL DE LA COMMUNAUTA no 467 (Bugnet ed. 1861); 7
TouLLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS nO 310 (1833).
79. But see Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
80. 209 La. 224, 24 So. 2d 456 (1945).
81. Ibid.
82. 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
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wife when most of the wealth of the estate consisted of land,
but it is of less benefit today in the present society in which
wealth consists primarily of movables. Though in Succession of
Geaganr3 the court expressed the opinion that the wife should
not be required to prove fraud to avoid gratuitous dispositions
of movables and directed the attention of the legislature to the
problem, the legislature has not yet seen fit to act. It is sub-
mitted that the problem would be best solved by jurisprudential
adoption of the French view by which excessive donations are
presumed fraudulent.8 4 The French view gives a more flexible
approach than a strict rule requiring the wife's consent to dona-
tions of movables or movables above a certain value, or a per-
centage of community assets. A rigid rule is likely to be too
great a restriction on the husband's managerial powers since it
might be beneficial to the community for the husband to make
donations of movables to further his business interest. Under
the suggested approach the court should consider all circum-
stances surrounding a donation of movables to determine its
propriety. The time of the donation relative to the termination
of the community, the person who receives the donation, the
value of the donation in relation to the value of the community
would be relevant factors to consider in determining whether
the donation is fraudulent.
REMEDIES OF THE WIFE
The restrictions on the husband's power as head and master
of the community are no more effective than the remedies avail-
able to the wife in case the husband exceeds the power granted
him by law. In general, the wife's remedies in such cases are
adequate to protect her. Where the wife is permitted to set
aside an unlawful transaction of her husband, the remedy is
satisfactory. The remedy is less satisfactory where the wife
has only an action for damages.
If the husband has made a fraudulent disposition of com-
munity property, article 2404 gives the wife an action against
her husband's heirs.8 5 The jurisprudence allows the wife to pro-
83. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1024 (1959) ; Succession of Geagan,
212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
84. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1024 (1959).
85. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
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ceed against a third person to whom community property has
been transferred in some situations.8 6 Thigpen v. Thigpen87 con-
cluded that the wife may proceed against her husband, instead
of his heirs, if the community is terminated while both spouses
are alive. The wife's remedy for fraudulent dispositions can be
exercised only after termination of the community or in con-
junction with an action to terminate it. 8  Usually the wife's
remedy for a fraudulent disposition of community property is
an action for damages. 89 If, however, the husband makes a
simulated alienation9" of community property, the wife may
proceed against the pretended transferee and set the transaction
aside when her remedy is exigible.91
The wife has an effective remedy if the husband makes a
prohibited donation of community immovables. On termination
of the community she may proceed against the donee in posses-
sion to have the donation set aside to the extent of her half
interest in the property.92 The remedy is personal to the wife
as the donation of community immovables is a relative nullity
which she may ratify.9 3 Of course, if the wife concurs in the
donation, it is a valid donation. 94 Likewise, it is obvious that
a donation of a community immovable by the husband to the
86. See Van Asselberg v. Van Asselberg, 164 La. 553, 114 So. 155 (1927);
Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 282, 108 So. 483 (1926) (simulated donation of
movables) ; Radovich v. Jenkins, 123 La. 355, 48 So. 988 (1909) ; Belden v.
Hanlon, 32 La. Ann. 85 (1880) (simulated mortgage).
87. 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956).
88. See LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1964) : "As long as the marriage continues
and the spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may not sue her
husband except for:
"(1) A separation of property;
"(2) The restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal property;
"(3) A separation from bed and board; or
"(4) A divorce."
See also Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So. 2d 485 (1960).
89. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956). The amount
of damages due the wife is usually recovered in settlement of the community.
90. A "simulated alienation" is a transaction, usually in the form of a sale,
in which the "vendor" does not intend to transfer ownership, and the "vendee'
does not intend to take ownership. See generally Lemann, Some Aspects of Simu-
lation in France and Louisiana, 29 TuL. L. REv. 22 (1954).
91. See Van Asselberg v. Van Asselberg, 164 La. 553, 114 So. 155 (1927).
92. Bister v. Menge, 21 La. Ann. 216 (1869).
93. Wisner v. City of New Orleans, 169 La. 1127, 126 So. 681 (1930). It is
unlikely that the court meant to say that the wife's action is not heritable. If
the community is terminated by her death, it seems probable that her heirs may
bring the action.
94. Bouny v. Anhueser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 155 La. 437, 99 So. 395 (1924)
(donation by husband and wife to children of the marriage) ; Snowden v. Cruse,
152 La. 144, 92 So. 764 (1922) (donation to wife).
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wife is valid, providing it does not impair the legitime of forced
heirs.9 5 .
Bister v. Menge96 concluded that if the husband made an
unlawful donation of a community immovable, the wife has no
action against his heirs under article 2404, but must proceed-
against the donee. The court indicated that the action against
the husband's heirs is available only if the husband's fraudulent
alienation is by onerous title. The language of article 2404 lends
some support to the decision. T The Bister decision should be
reconsidered in light of Thompson v. Thompson,98 in which the
court indicates that the public records doctrine protects a pur-
chaser relying on a recorded act of sale which is in fact a dis-
guised donation of a community immovable. The combination
of the two cases could leave the wife with no remedy at all.
Bister excludes a remedy against the husband's heirs. Thompson
excludes a remedy against the donee's transferee if the original
donation was disguised as a sale. It is submitted that the lan-
guage "or otherwise disposed of" in article 2404 is sufficiently
broad' to include disguised donations99 and thus afford the wife
a remedy against the husband or his heirs when none is avail-
able against the donee.
In French law the wife has a cause of action to set aside
donations of immovables only after partition of the community.
If property donated by the husband falls to her lot, she may.
then set aside the donation. 0 0 The rule seems practical as the
wife whose claims are otherwise satisfied would have no inter-
est in setting aside donations previously made. The rule, how-
ever, is contrary to Louisiana jurisprudence which indicates
that the wife has an interest in every specific asset of the com-
munity. 10 1
95. See Succession of Williams, 171 La. 151, 129 So. 801 (1930) ; Cavanaugh
v. Youngblood, 162 La. 22, 110 So. 75 (1926) ; Snowden v. Cruse, 152 La. 144,
92 So. 764 (1922).
96. 21 La. Ann. 216 (1869).
97. LA CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870), in part: "But if it should be proved
that the husband has sold the common property, or otherwise disposed of the
same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her action against the heirs of her
husband."
98. 211 La. 468, 30 So. 2d 321 (1947). See also Lacassagne v. Abraham, 51
La. Ann. 840, 25 So. 441 (1899).
99. Cf. Byrd v. Byrd, 230 La. 260, 88 So. 2d 214 (1956), where the wife
successfully set aside a donation in disguise without proving fraud. The husband
had retained a usufruct, thus making the donation an absolute nullity. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1533 (1870).
100. 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1029 (1959).
101. See Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964);
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If, in violation of article 2334, the husband sells community
property recorded in the name of the wife without her consent,
the effect of the transaction is unclear. Carter v. Brown 02 held
that the sale was valid as to the husband's half interest but null
as to the wife's half interest in the property. The result seems
correct on the facts of the case. As the community had been
terminated by divorce, the former spouses were owners in indivi-
sion. l0 3 If the wife had been permitted to set aside the entire
sale, the warranties of sale would preclude the husband from
claiming against his vendee.10 4 The result achieved in Carter is
plainly inapplicable if the wife asserts against the transferee
the nullity of the sale during the existence of the community.10 5
Application of the Carter case would result in a partial partition
of the community under circumstances in which a partition of
the community is not authorized by law.10 6 Dictum in Succes-
sion of Franek'0 7 indicates, however, that the husband's sale of
community property recorded in the name of the wife is abso-
lutely null. This solution seems appropriate if the wife is per-
mitted to assert against the vendee the nullity of the sale during
the existence of the community. The restriction on the hus-;
band's managerial power was designed to protect the wife's in-
terest and to preclude his involving her in litigation over her
separate property. 0 8 To achieve this purpose it seems she should
have an immediate remedy against the vendee.
The same remedy should be available to the wife if, in vio-
lation of article 2334, the husband conveys immovable com-,
munity property recorded in the name of both spouses without
the consent of the wife after she had filed the requisite declara-
tion that her consent was necessary.
The right of the wife to assert during the existence of the
community the nullity of a sale or mortgage by the husband
Beatty v. Vining, 147 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Comment, 25 LA. L.
REV. 159 (1964).
102. 55 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
103. See Ramsey v. Beck, 151 La. 190, 91 So. 674 (1922).
104. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2476, 2501 (1870) ; Reymond v. Louisiana
Trust & Savings Bank, 177 La. 409, 148 So. 663 (1933) (assertion of homestead
exemption under LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1).
105. It has never been decided that she can assert the nullity during the exist-
ence of the community.
106. Partition of the community is authorized only after its termination. LA..
CIVIL CODE art. 2406 (1870).
107. 224 La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1954).
108. See note 40 supra.
-1965]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
subsequent to the wife's filing a declaration of "family home"
seems to have been upheld in Reymond v. Louisiana Trust &
Savings Bank.10 9 There is some confusion in the case between
the constitutional "homestead exemption"11 0 and the statutory
"declaration of family home,""' and the case may hold that
the wife can claim the "homestead exemption" in the event the
husband refuses to do So. 11 2 The husband had given a second
mortgage on property occupied by the wife as a residence after
the wife filed a declaration of family home. The wife did not
sign the mortgage. The property was sold upon execution by
the first mortgagee. The second mortgagee purchased the prop-
erty for approximately $3000 in excess of the sum due the first
mortgagee. The wife sued the second mortgagee for $2000, the
then amount of the homestead exemption. In upholding her
claim the court concluded that the constitutional and statutory
provisions should be construed together, the statutes supple-
menting the Constitution. Perhaps the confusion resulted from
the wife's assertion of rights under both and her claim of only
$2,000 rather than the full amount of the excess over that due
the first mortgagee.
The decision seems to weaken the wife's protection under
the "homestead exemption" by requiring her to file a declara-
tion of family home in order to assert the exemption. The two:
provisions seem totally unrelated, for as the court said in Smith
v. Marino :"3 "Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution deals
with certain rights and exemptions of certain debtors with re-
spect to their creditors, while Act 35 of 1921, Ex.Sess., simply
accords certain rights between husband and wife."'" 4 It is sub-
mitted that after the wife has filed a declaration of family home,
a vendee or mortgagee of the husband can acquire no rights
affecting the home without the consent of the wife, and the
wife has a right to assert the nullity of the transaction. The
purpose of the declaration of "family home" seems clearly to
prevent the husband from depriving his wife and children of a
109. 177 La. 409, 148 So. 663 (1933). See also Smith v. Marino, 28 So. 2d
780 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) (concerning cause of action by wife after dissolution
of the community).
110. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
111. LA. R.S. 9:2801-2804 (1950).
112. Reymond v. Louisiana Trust & Say. Bank, 177 La. 409, 148 So. 663
(1933).
113. 28 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
114. Id. at 783.
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residence through exercise of his broad powers of management
and control of the community. 1 5 That such is the purpose of
the "family home" is indicated by the fact that the statute is
not limited to community property but provides that even the
separate property of the husband may be designated "family
home," 1 6 and the fact that the restriction on sale or mortgage
is not removed upon separation from bed and board, but only
upon dissolution of the marriage or the joint declaration of
husband and wife."17 It seems the purpose of the statute can be
achieved only if the wife is permitted to assert the nullity of
the illegal transactions performed by her husband.
POWER OF THE WIFE TO ALIENATE COMMUNITY PROPERTY""
In General
It is well settled in Louisiana that the wife cannot, acting
in her own name, alienate or encumber community immov-
ables."19 The rule is so strong that one dealing with a woman
may not rely on public records, but must go outside the record
to determine her marital status.' 20 The rule seems appropriate
in a community property system giving the husband broad
powers to manage the community. Further, since the husband
is personally liable for community debts,' 2' he should have ade-
quate control over what debts the community incurs and upon
what terms the community assets are alienated.
Exceptionally, the husband has been held estopped to assert
115. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870), as amended regarding sale of com-
munity property recorded in the joint names of husband and wife.
116. See LA. R.S. 9:2801 (1950).
117. See id. 9:2804.
118. This Comment considers only the power of the wife to alienate or en-
cumber community property. The general powers of the wife to obligate the com-
munity, contractually or otherwise, are fully discussed in Comment, 25 LA. L.
REV. 201 (1964).
119. See Murphy v. Burns, 63 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. La. 1945) (mineral lease)
Ducasse v. Modica, 224 La. 318, 69 So. 2d 358 (1953) (mortgage); Roccaforte
v. Barbin, 212 La. 69, 31 So. 2d 521 (1947) (sale); Bywater v. Enderle, 175
La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932) (husband can prevent wife from answering inter-
rogatories when result could be judgment granting property to another) ; Succes-
sion of James, 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920) (mortgage) ; Thomas v. Winsey,
76 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (sale) ; Vanzant v. Morgan, 181 So. 660
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1938) (sale).
120. See Succesison of James, 147 La. 944, 951, 86 So. 403, 405 (1920)
"[T]he only question remaining is whether it devolves upon a person who deals
with a purchaser of immovable property to find out whether he or she was mar-
ried or single at the date of the purchase, and we must hold in the affirmative
on that question."
121. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201 (1964).
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title to community immovables alienated by the wife. The
estoppel has been sustained where the husband acknowledged
that the property alienated was the wife's separate property,2
2
where he received the benefit of the proceeds of the transac-
tion,'2 3 and where he joined in the act of sale or mortgage. 24
These cases are not inconsistent with the general principle that
the husband controls the community, as in each instance he
could have prevented the transaction.
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Jones'25 presents a rare instance
in which a wife effectively alienated community property when
the husband perhaps could not have prevented the transaction.
The court held that a deed from a married woman conveying
community property was a "just title" sufficient to support a
plea of ten years acquisitive prescription.'
2 6
Generally the wife has no more authority to alienate com-
munity movables than she has to alienate community immov-
ables.'2 7 There is at least one exception. Article 1786 provides
that the husband's authorization of the wife's contracts for
necessities for herself and her family is presumed.' 28 Very early
the court held that "contracts" was broad enough to include
sales of community movables by the wife if the evidence shows
that the wife and children were in necessitous circumstances,
that a movable was sold for a valuable consideration, that the
sale was for the purpose of providing support for the wife and
children, and that the proceeds of the sale were so applied. 2 9
122. Rousseau v. Rousseau, 209 La. 428, 24 So. 2d 676 (1946) ; Pfister v.
Casso, 161 La. 940, 109 So. 770 (1926); Stewart v. Mix, 30 La. Ann. 1036
(1878) ; Willis v. Gordon, 94 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
123. Cato v. Bynum, 98 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
124. Norman Mayer & Co. v. Montgomery, 187 La. 374, 174 So. 880 (1937)
Cato v. Bynum, 98 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). But of. Coro v. Smith,
36 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) (signing waiver of homestead in mortgage
.did not bind the community).
125. 160 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
126. No question of the good faith of the vendee was raised. Whether the
vendee was in good faith seems questionable. Compare note 120 supra.
127. See Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223 La. 504,
66 So. 2d 317 (1953) (wife assented to repossession) ; Preston v. Humphreys,
5 Rob. 299 (La. 1843) ; Liberal Finance Corp. v. Washington, 62 So. 2d 545
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) (wife assented to seizure of automobile for debt);
.Carter v. Nunity & Goldblum, 85 So. 2d 709 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (wife
authorized removal of furniture for security on debt).
128. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1786 (1870) : ". . . The authorization of the hus-
band to the commercial contracts of the wife is presumed by law, if he permits
.her to trade in her own name; to her contracts for necessaries for herself and
family, where he does not himself provide them; and to all her other contracts,
when he is himself a party to them."
129. Johnson v. Pike, 14 La. Ann. 731 (1859). See Thibodaux v. Richard,
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-These cases do not indicate that the circumstances enlarge the
powers of the wife; rather the cases rely on an implied authori-
zation of the husband. Since an authorization to sell immov-
ables must be in writing, 30 it seems unlikely that the wife in
necessitous circumstances could alienate immovables without the
written consent of the husband.
The wife's lack of power to alienate community property ex-
tends to transactions other than a sale. It extends to confessions
of judgment, suffering a default judgment, and in some cir-
cumstances to admissions made in answer to interrogatories. I31
The broad conception of an alienation is probably necessary to
preserve the husband's power to manage the community.
Absence or Incapacity of the Husband
Louisiana law makes no general provision for the admin-
istration of the community by the wife during the absence or
incapacity of the husband. If the husband is an absentee or an
interdict, the wife is preferred in appointment of a curator. 32
Her administration would, of course, be subject to the duties
and liabilities of any curatorship. The curatorship of the estate
of a married man seems to include management of the com-
munity as the Code makes no provision for its separate admin-
-istration. Although not directly decided by the Louisiana courts,
it seems the wife of the absentee or interdict who is not ap-
pointed curatrix would have to apply to the curator for funds
necessary for support of herself and her children.133
Special provision permits the spouse of an absentee to pre-
vent the presumptive heirs from being placed in provisional
possession of the absentee's estate. By doing so the present
60 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952) for a more recent expression of the same
principle.
130. See Krupp v. Nelson, 50 .So. 2d 464 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; Parham
V. Gaspard, 26 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
131. See Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 1011, 145 So. 118, 119 (1932)
"But it is clear that a husband or wife who, by confessing judgment, by suffer-
ing a judgment by default, or by admissions made in answer to interrogatories,
enables another to take away the community property, does in fact alienate such
.property as effectively as if he or she had sold it. And it would be too narrow
a construction to place on the statute, in view of its manifest purpose,' to hold
that the prohibition against any alienation by the husband (and by the same
token, by the wife) applies only to conveyances by deed of sale, for a judgment
awarding property to another conveys it as effectively as the most formal deed."
132. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 47-55 (1870), concerning the curatorship of
absentees, and id. arts. 389-426, concerning the curatorship of interdicts.
133. See In re Leech, 45 La. Ann. 194, 12 So. 126 (1893).
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spouse continues the community and administers it. 1" 4 Presum-
ably the wife of an absentee could take over administration of
the community without formality. Such procedure seems in-
advisable, however, as the wife might lose the right to renounce
the community at its termination.
13 5
If the husband is incapacitated, but not to such extent that
interdiction is possible, the law does not authorize the wife to
take over administration of the community. Perhaps the wife
could obtain a separation of property in these circumstances. 36
If not, her ability to obligate the community for necessaries
offers some protection. 13 7 Several community property states
have provided for court appointment of the wife as head of the
family with power to act in the name of the community in the
same manner as the husband when he is incapacitated.13  Prop-
erly limited, such legislation seems desirable in Louisiana, pro-
vided it eliminates the personal liability of the husband for the
community debts the wife incurred.
CONCLUSION
A community property system in which the husband is to
administer the community must accommodate two conflicting
interests. To administer the community effectively, the husband
must have broad power to control the use of community prop-
erty, the terms upon which it will be alienated, and the condi-
tions upon which it will become obligated. At the same time
these powers must be sufficiently limited to protect the wife's
interest.
The Code gives adequate consideration to both interests. The
husband is given broad powers. The wife is protected against
injury by the husband in his management of community im-
movables. Indeed, the law may be too restrictive in requiring
the wife's consent to dispose of or encumber community im-
movables recorded in the name of both spouses.
134. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 64 (1870); Pedlahore v. Pedlahore, 151 La. 288,
91 So. 738 (1922). The temporary administration continues until the heirs of
the absent spouse become entitled to absolute possession of the absentee's estate.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 70 (1870).
135. Id. art. 2412. But cf. art. 64.
136. See id. art. 2425; cf. Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob. 342 (La. 1844) ; Comment,
25 LA. L. REV. 241 (1964).
137. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1786 (1870). See text at note 128 supra.
138. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-5 (1953).
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The power of the husband to donate movables by particular
title is the primary source of potential injury to the wife. This
power has been too liberally interpreted to provide an effective
balance between the rights of the wife and the discretion neces-
sary for the husband to administer the community, particularly
in modern times when the greatest wealth consists of movable
property.
Alterations in the present system of control and manage-
ment of the community should be carefully weighed in light of
two considerations: as the husband and his separate estate are
liable for community debts even after termination of the com-
munity, he should have sufficient discretion to administer it
effectively; the wife does not need protection against the bona
fide acts of her husband as she can absolve herself from his
mismanagement by renouncing the community on its termina-
tion.
Autley B. Newton
SETTLEMENT OF COMMUNITY RIGHTS
In the Louisiana community property system, most prop-
erty acquired during marriage is held by the conjugal partner-
ship or community of acquets and gains, rather than by the
spouses in their individual capacities.' Thus, upon the com-
munity's termination, there must be some sort of settlement so
that the spouses or their heirs may receive their appropriate
shares. Generally, a settlement entails computation of the total
value of the community assets, substraction of the community
debts outstanding, and division of the residue between the for-
mer husband and wife, or their heirs.
SETTLEMENTS- JUDICIAL OR CONVENTIONAL
Although the law contemplates that there shall be a liquida-
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2332 (1870): "The partnership, or community of
acquets or gains, needs not to be stipulated; it exists by operation of law, in
all cases where there is no stipulation to the contrary. But the parties may
modify or limit it; they may even agree that it shall not exist."
Id. art. 2399: "Every marriage contracted in this State, superinduces of
right partnership or community of acquets or gains, if there be no stipulation
to the contrary."
See also id. arts. 2334, 2404: Comments, 25 LA. L. REv. 95 (1964).
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